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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
In a world of international economic interdependence, it is inevitable
that the economic policy of one state will have economic effects on others. The
dilemma faced by the community of nations is that it is not possible for any
state in this widely diversified world to comport its laws fully to the
dimensions of international trade.
Recently, several nations have called into question the wide extraterrito-
rial reach of U.S. antitrust laws.' To date, a number of countries have
enacted defensive, retaliatory legislation, designed to inhibit the reach of
U.S. laws. The British government's recent enactment of the "Protection of
Trading Interests Act"2 ("POTI Act") represents the strongest action taken to
date by a government to resist foreign pressures and the encroachment of
foreign government policy into its territory.
The purposes of this article are to identify the reasons why the British
were provoked into enacting such assertive legislation, and to briefly outline
the POTI Act itself.
II. THE EXERCISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction covers a wide area. It
encompasses crime generally and such particular areas as labor laws,
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1. The United States antitrust statutes affecting foreign trade are the Sherman
Act, §§ 1 and 2 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1976)), the Clayton Act, §§ 3, 7, and 12 (15 U.S.C.
§§ 14, 18, and 22 (1976)), the Federal Trade Commission Act, §§ 4 and 5 (15 U.S.C.
§§ 44 and 45 (1976)), the Wilson Tariff Act, §§ 73, 74, 75, and 76 (15 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 10,
and 11 (1976)), the Webb-Pomerene Act, §§ 1, 2, 3, and 4 (15 U.S.C. §§ 61, 62, 63, and
64 (1976)). The problem faced in the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws is not a problem
peculiar to antitrust. Similar problems are also related to illicit payments (Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1976)). There are
also some questions as to the Environmental Protection Act's extraterritorial reach
(Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 (1976 and Supp. III 1979)).
2. 1980, c.11; in force March 20, 1980; [Bill 66], Protection of Trading Interests
Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on November 15, 1979. See Lowe, Blocking
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
(58)
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securities laws, currency laws, shipping contracts, production of documents,
and others.' The many facets of international trade are usually controlled by
national legislation. Jurisdictional problems, therefore, generally do not raise
intractable problems in international trade. However, antitrust laws, and
particularly their extraterritorial enforcement, have caused international
conflicts which are the focus of this discussion.4
The two major theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction at loggerheads in
the United States-British conflict are those of the "effects doctrine" and
"strict territoriality." The United States' adherence to the "effects doctrine" is
one extreme, while the United Kingdom's adherence to "territoriality" is the
other.
The United States' concept of legislative jurisdiction is based upon the
doctrine of "effects." 5 According to the "effects doctrine," any act abroad that
was intended to and did affect U.S. interstate or foreign commerce is subject
to U.S. antitrust laws - irrespective of the nationality of the parties or the
place of occurrence.
At one time the United States supported the doctrine that a court in one
state could order an act to be done in another state, provided the act did not
violate the laws of the state in which it was to be performed.' Later, this rule
was broadened to the point where courts assumed they had authority to order
or regulate conduct abroad - regardless of the fact that such action might
violate foreign statutes
3. Jennings, The Proper Reach of Territorial Jurisdiction: A Case Study of Diver-
gent Attitudes, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 35 (1972).
4. 'he Antitrust laws of the United States, of the European Communities, and
of the Member States which have such laws, are all capable of some kind of ex-
traterritorial applications." COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST at 50 (Rahl ed.
1970).
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
"Any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends." See also, ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS at 6 (1977).
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 94 (1934); Onkelinx, Conflict of Interna-
tional Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the
Situs, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 487, 502 (1969).
7. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 39 (1965). "A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person
to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having
jurisdiction with respect to that conduct."
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The majority of nations' take a much narrower view and do not accept
the "effects doctrine" as a basis for exercising jurisdiction in the area of
antitrust law. The nations opposing this doctrine argue that it was meant
only to deal with conduct that is universally recognized to be criminal in
nature. Thus, national policies are not abridged when foreign courts exercise
wide extraterritorial jurisdiction over common crimes. A common example of
support for such an attitude occurs when a person standing in State A fires a
shot that kills another person on the other side of the border in State B. In
such a case, State B (the country where the person was killed and thus where
the effect was felt) would be considered to have subject matter jurisdiction.
The outlook reflected in the above example encourages the contention by
most nations that since a violation of U.S. antitrust laws' is not considered to
be a universal crime, U.S. courts cannot assume subject matter jurisdiction
under the doctrine of "effects" when such effects are a result of anticompeti-
tive conduct."0
The assumption of jurisdiction by U.S. courts over such anticompetitive
conduct is regarded by these countries to be an infringement on their
national sovereignty. The alleged infringement is often viewed with indigna-
tion, as was expressed by the House of Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp."
The British attitude towards the question of extraterritorial antitrust
law jurisdiction was officially stated in one case brought by Britain before the
European Commission against a number of dyestuff companies including
Imperial Chemical Industries." The British government advanced its some-
what unusual stand by issuing to the European Commission an aide memoire
in which it stated that jurisdiction should not be exercised on the basis of
mere effects.'3 Additionally, extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws
may sometimes conflict with the specific policies or interests of other states.
The "Uranium Case" provides a classic example."
8. See, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY at 31 (1977).
9. See supra note 1.
10. Griffin, American Antitrust Law and Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 137, 138 (1978).
11. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1977] ALL E.R. 434.
12. Commission's Decision of July 24, 1969. Ruling on Dyestuff Manufacturers, 12
E.E.C.J.O. No. L195 (Aug. 1, 1969), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) at 9314 (1969).
13. Jennings supra note 3 at 38.
14. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill.
1978), consolidated sub nom. In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 466 F. Supp.
958 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1979).
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Since many nations regard the assumption of jurisdiction by a foreign
court based on economic effects as an intrusion upon their sovereignty, they
believe such extraterritorial actions justify retaliation in the form of trade
regulation legislation. Such an action may in turn be viewed as an
infringement of the sovereignty of the state where the alleged conduct
occurred. This chain of events can lead to an escalation in restrictive trade
practices.
III. THE ERA OF RETALIATORY MEASURES
Formerly, the United States was the only country with comprehensively-
developed antitrust legislation.'5 Recently, however, there has been a
remarkable increase in the number of countries adopting antitrust laws. This
change has occurred not only in the developed or industrialized nations, but
also in developing or non-industrialized countries. 6
The emergence of antitrust legislation in many countries is considered to
be a direct rebuttal to the United States' extraterritorial enforcement of its
own antitrust laws." Indeed, a primary purpose of these legislative enact-
ments appears to be an attempt by national governments to frustrate or
resist foreign enforcement actions in their territories. A number of states now
have "blocking" legislation. 8 Such laws bar compliance with foreign direc-
15. See supra note 1.
16. See, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 89th CONG., 1st SEss. 630, 903, 926 (1965) (Appendix, Antitrust De-
velopment and Regulations of Foreign Countries). Some of these newer laws exercise
wider coverage than do U.S. antitrust laws. For instance, the antitrust legislation of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") prohibits re-
fusal to sell, an offense not included in the U.S. laws. See OECD REPORT OF COMMITTEE
OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ON REFUSAL TO SELL (1969). The Scan-
dinavian States were among the first group of nations to adopt a public cartel register,
and a similar feature is now a part of many foreign antitrust laws. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 467 (2d ed. 1973).
17. One such example is the United Kingdom's Protection of Trading Interests Act
["POTI'. "Britain's new Protection of Trading Interests Bill - target America; though
it applies to all countries." THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3-9, 1979, at 66.
18. E.g., Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, South Africa, Switzerland, and West Germany. See Marks, State Department
Perspectives on Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 153 (1978); "The
Australians have taken a far tougher line. This year they passed a law - and have
used it in the Uranium affair - empowering their government to declare unenforce-
able in Australia any foreign antitrust judgment that it deems extraterritorial or even
merely against Australia's national interest." Supra note 17, at 66. See, e.g., Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl. Acts No. 121, § 5; Ship-
ping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, Laws of 1964 c. 87, § 2 (United
Kingdom) (The POTI Act seeks to repeal this law; see Bill's Explanatory Memorandum,
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tives that request inspection of documents or evidence that is located within
the enacting nation's territory. 9
IV. BRITISH RETALIATORY LEGISLATION AGAINST
U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS
Of the laws enacted in retaliation against U.S. antitrust laws, the
strongest measure to date comes from the United Kingdom. While the British
supra note 2, at i); Canada, various statutes preventing compliance with subpoenas in
uranium litigation. Atomic Energy Control Act, 1970, Can. Rev. Stat. C. A-19, and
Uranium Information Security Regulations, Stat. 0. & R. 76-644 (1976). See In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273 (1977). Canadian
Foreign Proceedings & Judgments Bill. Bill No. C41, July 11, 1980; The statutes of two
Canadian provinces also prohibit the production of any documents pursuant to the
order of any other jurisdiction. Business Records Protection Act, 1947, ONT. REV. STAT.
c. 54 (1970); Business Concerns Records Act 1964, QuE. REV. STAT. c. 278 records and
data pursuant to a foreign court order and compliance with foreign antitrust orders,
decrees, and judgments has been recommended by the REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF
CANADIAN INDUSTRY 408 (1968). In some other nations, general laws prohibit the re-
moval or furnishing of certain kinds of materials. See arts. 89, 93, Law No. 17, Jan. 30,
1961, of the Republic of Panama, prohibiting the removal of, or copying of documents
for use in an action outside of Panama in compliance with an order of an authority not
of the Republic of Panama; quoted in Application of The Chase Manhattan Bank, 297
F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962); STGB, C.P., COD. PEN, arts. 271, 273; 1951 ROLF 12,
1938 ROLF 846, prohibiting certain acts for a foreign state, and furnishing of secret
economic information to a foreign official or firm; French Law Concerning Communica-
tion of Documents and Information of an Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial
or Technical nature to Aliens. See Law Pertaining to the Disclosure of Documents and
Information of an Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial, or Technical Nature or
Juristic Persons, July 16, 1980; The Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, art.
39, stb. 401, as amended by Act of July 16, 1958, stb. 413 (Netherlands); "New Zealand
has just joined Australia and the U.K. in passing legislation to restrict the flow of
information to the United States on antitrust matters." Financial Times, Aug. 18,
1980, at 24, col. 5; South America, Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, § 30, 15 Stat. Rep.
So. Afr. 1045 (1977); Switzerland: Section 271 of the Swiss Penal Code apparently im-
poses criminal sanctions on any person who, without permission of the Swiss govern-
ment, provides documents on behalf of a foreign government; West Germany, Law of
May 24, 1965, § 11 (1965) Burdesgesetzblatt [BGBI] II 835. British Commonwealth,
resolution by 41 British Commonwealth Nations encouraging all members of the Com-
monwealth to pass legislation curtailing extraterritorial application of United States
procedural and antitrust laws. [1980] ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-10,
May 8, 1980.
19. See, KALINOWSKI, V., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS, section
94.09(1) (1977); Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litiga-
tion: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-
Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974).
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have enacted a number of general, substantive antitrust laws since 19 4 8 , 2
the POTI Act is the first purely retaliatory act.
In Parliament, the British Secretary of Trade made two fundamental
points in support of the POTI Act. First, he emphasized the United
Kingdom's strict adherence to the principle of territoriality as a basis of
jurisdiction, arguing that the United States' "pernicious extraterritorial
effects doctrine has created uncertainty for international industry in this
country and elsewhere. ' 21 Secondly, he viewed the imposition of treble
damages by U.S. courts as penal rather than compensatory. Treble damages
are "by no stretch of the imagination mere restitution or reparation to the
injured party."2
The factors that led the British government to enact the POTI Act can be
traced back to instances such as the famous Imperial Chemical Industries
(I.C.I.) litigation.' In that case, the British court enjoined I.C.I. from
complying with a decree issued by a U.S. court.2' The vital element that
served as a catalyst for the introduction and adoption of the POTI Act was
20. The monopolies and mergers in the United Kingdom are controlled by the
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of 1948. See 11 and 12
Geo. 6, c. 66, reprinted in 3 OECD Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, § 1.0 (United Kingdom) (hereinafter cited as OECD Guide); MERGERS, CONSOLIDA-
TION AND BIG BUSINESS (The Dichley Foundation, 1970); WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL AND
ELLES, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES (2d ed. 1966, with
1969 supplement)) and the Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965 (3 OECD Guide, § 1.1).
The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act of 1953 provided for the
enlargement of the Commission. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 (4 and 5
Eliz. 2, c. 68, 3 OECD Guide, § 1.2) and that of 1968 (3 OECD Guide, § 1.5) are the
statutes which deal with restrictive business practices. The Fair Trading Act of 1973
created the office of Director General of Fair Trading with the power to make monopoly
reference to the Commission. The other relevant legislation is the 1964 Shipping Con-
tracts and Commercial Documents Act (Shipping Contracts and Commercial Docu-
ments Act, 1964) (the POTI Act seeks to repeal this Act) (Bill's Explanatory Memoran-
dum, supra note 2, at i.). This Act was enacted primarily to thwart the Federal Mari-
time Commission's investigation of North Atlantic Conference activities which in-
volved English vessels (Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964).
21. See Hansard, November 15, 1979, 1533-91.
22. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust, 33
BRIT. Y.B. INrr'L 146, 148 (1957).
23. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
24. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1953], 2
ALL E. R. 780 (C.A.) (injunction by lower court against compliance with U.S. decree
affirmed; American decree was "intrusion" on British sovereignty); British Nylon Spin-
ners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1955], 1 Ch. 19, [1952], Ch. 37, 1954, 3
ALL E. R. 88 (Ch.).
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the U.S. Justice Department's appointment of a grand jury to investi-
gate an alleged international uranium cartel. 25 Additionally, in 1977
the House of Lords rejected Westinghouse Electric's attempt to obtain
evidence relating to the same alleged international uranium cartel.2 6 The
British were further alarmed by the filing of legal actions by private
American interests seeking damages allegedly caused by two primarily
British consortia that had taken part in a cartel accused of fare-fixing on the
North Atlantic.'
In the presence of these conflicts, one observer remarked that "the
British government, like several others, is fed up with American attempts to
extend American antitrust law to things - like the uranium cartel, whose
reality is scarcely in question - done outside America by non-Americans."
Another commentator wrote that the POTI Act exists because "the simmer-
ing British frustration has come to a full boil. '29 It was further stated that in
the area of antitrust law, "the level of conflict" between the United States
and the United Kingdom "has continued to rise in recent years," and the
following reasons were outlined for such a rise:
First the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have been increasingly
active in international business practices. Secondly, in accordance with
its general policy, the Justice Department has increasingly investigated
in this field by use of the grand jury. . .Thirdly, the United States has
been willing to prosecute as antitrust violations private business
conduct which a foreign government has - at least privately - favored,
encouraged or facilitated. Finally, expansion of British companies into
the United States during the past decade has produced some highly
visible merger suits (such as BP-Sohio) (1970 CHH Trade Cases, para
72988 (N.D. Ohio 1969)) and British Oxygen-AIRCO (557 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1977)) which has been widely criticized by the British press as
discriminatory and protectionist."
25. See generally, "United Nuclear Wins Judgment In Uranium Case," Wall St. J.,
Mar. 3, 1978, at 6 col. 1 "U.S. Charges Gulf Oil in Uranium Price Fixing," Washington
Post, May 10, 1978, at A2; see also, Kohlmeier, The Uranium Affair, 13 J. INT'L L. &
EcoN. 149 (1978).
26. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978], 2 W.L.R.
81 (H.L. 1977).
27. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 17, at 64-66.
28. Id. at 66.
29. Baker, "U.K. Using New Weapons to Attack Foreign Reach of U.S. Trust
Laws," Nat'l L.J., January 14, 1980, at 24.
30. Id., at col. 1-2.
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Prior to the introduction of the POTI in Parliament, extensive discus-
sions took place between the governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom, however, these talks were of no great consequence.
"[Elnough's enough - this bloody nonsense has to stop" was the attitude of
the government of the United Kingdom.' Consequently, in September, 1979,
the British Secretary of Trade announced publicly that his government would
introduce legislation to make some U.S. antitrust judgments unenforceable
in the United Kingdom." The following November, the British government
introduced the POTI Bill in the Parliament which later gave its final
approval to the legislation.
The POTI Act was intended to provide "protection for persons in the
United Kingdom from certain measures taken under the laws of overseas
countries when those measures apply to things done outside such countries
. . .,,33 The POTI Act empowered the Trade Secretary to take measures to
restrict the trade regulation efforts of another government when "things done
or to be done outside the territorial jurisdiction of that country by persons
carrying on business in the United Kingdom, are damaging or threaten to
damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom .. .31
The Act under section 2 authorizes the Secretary of Trade to prohibit
export of documents in compliance with foreign directives to a court, tribunal
or authority of an overseas country. The POTI Act also provides that a British
court shall refuse discovery requests, if it is shown that the request "infringes
the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom."35 Section 3 is a penal clause and
provides penalties for failure to comply with the requirements under sections
1 and 2.1 British courts are enjoined under section 5 from entertaining any
foreign multiple damage awards," and under section 4 from complying with a
recovery request when the Secretary of State has given a certificate that the
recovery request "infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is
otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom . . .,3 The
Trade Secretary's certificate is binding on the courts.
A final, unique provision of the POTI Act is section 6. This section
provides that British citizens, United Kingdom corporations, and other
31. Id., at col. 2.
32. Supra note 27 at 66.
33. Bill's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 2 at i.
34. POTI Act, supra note 2 at § 1(1)(b).
35. Id., at § 2(2)(a).
36. Id., at § 3.
37. Id., at § 5.
38. Id., at § 4.
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persons who carry on business within the United Kingdom, and have been
subjected to a multiple-damage judgment overseas, are entitled to recover
through the British courts the same damages awarded to the party overseas. 9
V. CONCLUSION
In considering the problem of extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust
law, the most important question to focus upon is whether it is possible to
formulate any principles or procedures that will moderate and make
reciprocally tolerable these encroachments on state sovereignty.0 The
existence of concurrent jurisdiction does not cause any difficulty where there
is a common interest in the exercise of that jurisdiction. Such a common
interest may be identified and agreed upon through bilateral or multilateral
arrangements. What may be needed is simply a moderate approach, such as
the "jurisdictional rule of reason" suggested by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.4
1
If the present situation with regard to extra-territorial antitrust law
enforcement persists, it appears that there will soon be a flood of "Protection
of Trading Interests Acts." Such acts may not be confined simply to antitrust
contexts, but may expand into retaliatory protection of other areas of national
trading interests.
39. Id., at § 6.
40. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE FiFTY-FiRST CONFERENCE,
(TOKYO 1964), comments by McDougal at 331.
41. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assn., 549
F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1977).
